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1. INTRODUCTION
We use commodity computing platforms for many tasks,
including entering or editing sensitive data on them. Un-
fortunately, the graphical user interfaces (GUI) running on
these devices are not designed to provide a secure means of
ensuring users that they are interacting with the authentic
application and not with some fake one. These design weak-
nesses are often exploited by adversaries. They try to steal
security sensitive data by tricking users to enter such data
into “authentic”-looking applications.
Secure GUIs have been proposed as a solution to this prob-
lem, e.g., [2, 6, 4], and few commercial secure operating sys-
tems employ these concepts, e.g., [3]. The main idea is that
a trusted part of the operating system controls what is dis-
played on the screen, and the user is always able to invoke a
trusted path to this part. Most of the secure GUI proposals
include a reserved area on the screen that is used to display
information about which application is currently having the
input/output focus of the user and what type of security or
trustworthiness this application has (e.g., trusted/untrusted
or confidential/secret/topsecret). The reserved area in the
proposed secure GUI implementations is usually a top- or
bottom-screen status bar, e.g., [3].
Obviously, it is very important that users know the mean-
ing of the reserved area of secure GUIs, perceive the infor-
mation in it, and only edit or enter sensitive data if the au-
thentic application with the corresponding sensitivity level is
enabled. A potential drawback of existing secure GUI imple-
mentations is that such indicators are passive ones – i.e., the
system does not actively prevent (because it is technically
not possible to do so) the user from entering sensitive data
in any untrusted application – and it is already known from
previous research in usable security [1, 5, 7, 8] that passive
indicators do not provide effective protection against attacks
in the web browser context. However, we want to find out
whether passive security indicators can still have a meaning
in the context of Secure GUIs.
While existing proposals [2, 6, 4, 3] provide strong security
guarantees from a technical point of view, none of them has
been evaluated with respect to the effective protection for
the average users. Thus, it is not known whether any of
them provides an effective protection.
2. OUR USABILITY STUDY
With our research we try to shed light in this situation.
We study two different approaches to display the reserved
area as trusted status bar: one on the top of the screen and
one on the bottom (see Figure 1), as these are the most
common places for status bars in the default settings of
most of the operating systems (note that the trusted sta-
tus bar is different and in addition to the normal status
bar of, e.g., Windows operating system). The approaches
we evaluated support four different virtual machines (here
called compartments) while for the user study only two were
started – a standard Windows (the Windows compartment)
and a secure compartment for privacy sensible university
services (the university compartment). Note, the authentic
university services are not reachable from the first compart-
ment and no other web services than the ones provided by
the university can be accessed from the university compart-
ment. This research is part of a project at our university
to improve the functionality and the usability of an existing
security-enhanced operating system with secure GUI imple-
mentation. As part of this project 130 students from differ-
ent departments received laptops running this secure GUI
implementation when agreeing to help improving both; e.g.
by providing feedback and participating in user studies. In
the first phase of the project, we improved the design of the
status bar with respect to the colors and the labels used for
the different compartments throughout pre-tests and an on-
line survey before. These were evaluated in the user study.
Figure 1: Secure GUI status bar (at the bottom)
indicating the current active compartment
In the second phase, we evaluated the same status bar
once being displayed at the top and once at the bottom of the
display by conducting a lab user study in order to answer the
following research question: How likely do participants select
the proper compartment with the two different secure GUI
implementations. The user study consists of the following
parts:
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• The students were welcomed and received the instructions
including the overall scenario (job application) and the
corresponding tasks to be conducted.
• The students solved four tasks on a test laptop (it was
not possible to use their laptop as the new interfaces was
not yet been deployed). The study conductor took notes
about successful and failed tasks.
• After every task, each participant evaluated it, by an-
swering questions on a second laptop. Note, the reason
for using a second laptop was to have time to adjust the
test laptop unnoticed between two tasks.
• The students filled out a questionnaire about their demo-
graphics and they were asked to not reveal any informa-
tion about the study.
We included two uncritical tasks (one that was possible in
both compartments and one that was only possible to exe-
cute in the Windows compartment) and two tasks for which
it was necessary to enter the student ID and the correspond-
ing PIN (for both tasks the university compartment must be
used). The participants used their own student credentials.
In more detail, the tasks are the following:
• Task 1 (Search in local net) The participants were asked
to check whether any foreign language courses are offered
at the university in the next semester. (Proper Execution:
As the corresponding page is provided by our university
any of the two compartments can be used to properly
execute this task.)
• Task 2 (PIN entry w/o attack) Afterwards, the partic-
ipants were asked to download their recent transcript of
records from the university server. (Proper Execution:
The participant uses the university compartment.)
• Task 3 (Search in Internet) Next, we ask the participants
to search for a photo studio in order to get a professional
photos for their CVs. (Proper Execution: The participant
uses the Windows compartment.)
• Task 4 (PIN entry w/ attack) We ask the participants to
download their matriculation certificate to include it in
the application. (Proper Execution: The participant uses
the university compartment. Note, this task was more
difficult than task 2 because we launched unnoticed a fake
university application in the Windows compartment while
they answered the survey at the second laptop.)
With these tasks we can check whether participants switch
from the Windows compartment to the university compart-
ment before entering their PIN (task 2 and 4) and whether
they switch from the university compartment to the Win-
dows compartment for a search on the Internet (task 3).
We can also check whether they switch from the Windows
compartment to the university compartment before enter-
ing their PIN although the Windows compartment provides
a (fake) university application (task 4).
Ethical requirements for research involving human partici-
pants are provided by an ethics commission at the university.
The relevant ethical requirements (participant consent and
data privacy) were met.
3. RESULTS
26 of these students participated in our lab study, 13 in
each of the two groups. The group with the status bar dis-
played at the top of the screen is in the following called
Group-Top and the one with the status bar displayed at
the bottom is called Group-Bottom. They were randomly
selected while being a representative sample of the 130 stu-
dents who received a laptop. Four people selected the uni-
versity compartment from the beginning until the end of the
test, hence we excluded them from the following evaluation.
Our results show that the status bar, independent from
being displayed at the top or the bottom of the screen, en-
ables participants to select the proper compartment in two of
three cases: For task 2 (PIN entry w/o attack) in Group-Top
11 out of 12 and in Group-Bottom 9 out of 10 switched from
the Windows compartment to the university compartment.
For task 3 (Search in Internet) in Group-Top 11 out of 12 and
in Group-Bottom 10 out of 10 switched from the university
compartment to the Windows compartment. However, in
task 4 (PIN entry w/ attack), only 5 out of 12 (Group-Top)
and 6 out of 10 (Group-Bottom) noticed that the university
application in the Windows compartment is not authentic
and switched to the university compartment before enter-
ing the PIN. Obviously, they have understood the meaning
of the different compartment however, the authentic-looking
(but faked) university application in the Windows compart-
ment was convincing enough for in total 11 out of 22. Thus,
the evaluated status bars do not yet effectively protect users,
and future research is necessary.
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